Oh, and here's my current public and official view here: There is a set of violence that is always OK to commit violence against known nazis.
That includes, but is not necessarily limited to: punching. Sucker punching. Punching to reduce their impact.
That does NOT include: sexual violence.
Just to be clear.
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Pies. Pies in the face also are allowed :-)
ReplyDeleteOh, and this is also a great example of when it is totally morally acceptable to violate the law. This was clearly battery, but battery most acceptable.
ReplyDeleteWant to lay out your reasoning/general rule? It's an interesting topic.
ReplyDeleteSam Zeitlin Maybe, but likely not at length.
ReplyDeleteTo take some shortcuts, we have deontological protections -- that is, there are rules governing behavior towards others and it is immoral to violate those rules towards people. Don't punch people is an obvious example. And so is "don't call for genocide".
Once you start violating those rules, then you no longer have deontological protection. That is, more or less, that it is no longer immoral to violate those standard rules towards you.
But, this is because I think:
-- We create moral rules to learn and create habits such that
-- We can act to our own excellence such that
-- We can do the most good.
That is, I see deontology in service of virtue, in service of UT. I'm a crazy guy like that.
I'm more curious about the nature of the trade-off. Why does calling for genocide permits punching but not sexual assault? Does it permit murder? Are there limits on the punching that is permitted?
ReplyDeleteSomething like this:
ReplyDeleteWhen I violate my standard rules (ie, don't punch people), it makes me a shittier person even when I do it to someone who is a garbage person. That is, by committing violence I become a less empathetic/good person. Generally.
And so, I suggest punching is morally OK as the degree of harm it does to me -- and others -- is sufficiently low. The degree of harm done to me by committing sexual assault would far outweigh that.
It is not to the nazi that I owe not violating this rule; it is to myself and to the harm caused to others.