I know we talked about this months ago, but as a refresher. I've tried to use a glib tone, but let me be clear: This is the most serious weapon systems in the history of the world, and the continued survival of human life rests on Donald Trump not saying specific words to the Joint Chiefs.
Who can authorize a nuclear strike?
The President. Only the President.
What's it take for the President to authorize a nuclear strike?
While the mechanics of this are fascinating, the core is: Tell the joint chiefs to launch. There's actually a little more to it than that, but that's essentially true.
What happens if the joint chiefs refuse?
That's a coup. It'd be bad. And if Trump has already used Twitter to announce a strike? That'd be worse.
What happens if the guys in the bunkers refuse?
They get shot, and someone else does it.
How many people might die?
I cannot give a glib answer to this. The United States nuclear stockpile is (still) sufficient to wipe out all human life from the planet, and most life larger than, say, a rabbit.
Is it lawful for the President to launch nukes?
Yep, and then he has 30 days to inform congress.
Can anyone else launch nukes?
Nope. We decided this was inherently a political decision, and move it to the President.
What's the nuclear triad?
-- The ICBM's in bunkers, capable of wiping out the world a couple times over.
-- The H-bombs on bombers, ready to be airbone. These used to be constantly airborne, but no longer. Taken together, these can destroy entire countries.
-- The MIRVd H-bombs on the subs. These are usually smaller, and are capable of destroying cities, and taking out most hardened targets.
Why do we maintain a triad?
To have "second strike" capability, such that in the event of being attacked we can destroy whoever did it. This was a deterrent for decades. It is madness.
Why are there floppies in the bunkers?
1) It works. Changing a system that controls world-ending nuclear weapons is not done quickly.
2) Hacking a floppy-drive powered system is hard.
Edit: Apparently we no longer have constantly airborne nuclear warheads. Good.
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"Yep, and then he has 30 days to inform congress." makes me giggle a bit, because... you know, I'm pretty sure they would already know.
ReplyDeleteIt does, technically, take the Secretary of Defense to sign off on it. Though the president can just fire them if they say no and move on to the next in line cabinet member... I don't know what would happen if all of the Department secretaries said no.
Technically, the Sec Def is to verify identity. He does not have the legal right to refuse the order, merely to say "Yep, that's trump"
ReplyDeleteFor the SecDef to do otherwise is illegal.
Are you sure? Because the stuff I'd read indicated that he could say no. But I've not done a ton of research on this.
ReplyDeleteWith a little luck the nuclear winter will let the glaciers recover and in twenty years we will all look back and laugh.
ReplyDeleteWikipedia says otherwise.
ReplyDeleteen.wikipedia.org - Nuclear football - Wikipedia
The references there are to Vox, Politico, and the New York Times.
But that's ... absurd!
ReplyDeleteI know. I didn't say this was right or good, but it is legal.
Brian Ashford "we"?
ReplyDeleteI live fives miles from the white house. In the event of a global thermonuclear war, you'll have to rebuild without me.
Hmm, maybe it's the wording is confusing, because to me this implies that SoD could decide ot not confirm the Order. I guess that could be different than saying no...https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Command_Authority
ReplyDeleteen.wikipedia.org - National Command Authority - Wikipedia
"The Secretary of Defense has legal authority to approve the order, but cannot veto it"
ReplyDelete"While the President does have unilateral authority as commander-in-chief to order that nuclear weapons be used for any reason at any time, ... "
I'm not sure what is the hangup here, Matt. This seems pretty clear cut. The job of the SecDef in this instance is to say "yes, that is the president".
sigh
ReplyDelete"The Secretary of Defense has legal authority to approve the order, but cannot veto it"
I read this as "The SoD can say no, but can't kill the order" Which would lead the president firing them and moving down the line. Because that doesn't actually mention confirming the President, so I assumed the "Approve" was about the order and thus a yes/no, not about the president and if he was real.
I mean, an Air Force Major got fired for asking how he knows the order came from a sane president -- Nixon.
ReplyDeleteIf the SecDef refuses, he can be summarily fired. And, well, probably shot. You then go to the deputy SecDef, and on down.
There's no legal leg for the SecDef to stand on to refuse to carry out a legal order.
So ... I'm not sure what you're saying. It's a legal order. You cannot legally disobey a legal order.
And again, from the wikipedia page on the football:
ReplyDeleteBefore the order can be processed by the military, the president must be positively identified using a special code issued on a plastic card, nicknamed the "biscuit".[5] The United States has a two-man rule in place at the nuclear launch facilities, and while only the president can order the release of nuclear weapons, the order must be verified by the Secretary of Defense to be an authentic order given by the president (there is a hierarchy of succession in the event that the president is killed in an attack). This verification process deals solely with verifying that the order came from the actual President. The Secretary of Defense has no veto power and must comply with the president's order
Jesus William, I'm not arguing with you, I'm saying how I misinterpreted it.
ReplyDeleteI apologize in advance for an entire lack of glibness.
ReplyDeleteRE: Who Can Authorize a Nuclear Strike: It is possible, though unconfirmed to my knowledge that there may be contingency scenario that would permit the launch of nuclear weapons in the event of the loss of the POTUS & National Command Authority. Logically this seems essential to a credible 'Second Strike' capability, but details are not public. While it is possible that this could permit a situation like in Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove where a rogue Air Force Colonel uses one of these contingencies to launch a first strike, it is likely that systems are in place that prevent such contingency plans from being used without verification of the loss of POTUS & NCA, and that the Two-Man Rule is involved.
RE: Method of Authorization: Procedure and some of the requirements are public knowledge, and they're scary. POTUS says he wants to launch, the military officer opens the football and they make a phone call. Someone present confirms that POTUS is who he says he is, probably the Secretary of Defense but it doesn't have to be. POTUS produces a a card the size of an Amex covered in numbers and reads off a set of them. This set of numbers indicates which Plan is to be launched. POTUS is supposed to keep this card on their person at all times. During the Carter Administration this card once went to the dry cleaners.
RE: Refusal: Refusal by the Joint Chiefs isn't a coup, it probably isn't even treason (the US has a very strict definition of treason). It is refusal to disobey an order, which is a court-martialable offense, but it is unclear if this could be prosecuted successfully. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) prohibits the following of orders that would result in a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide, which a first strike could reasonably be characterized as. It is worth noting that in drills run by the Air Force of the officers responsible for launching the silo-based ICBMs, the failure to launch rate is very high, close to 50%. While failing one of these drills could result in a court-martial, one never has. The failing officers are rotated out of the unit but the Air Force understands the high psychological barrier of possibly killing all of humanity. Would they be as forgiving during war time? Probably not, but the measure to ensure that a silo-based ICMB is launched isn't that one of the two men in the bunker is shot. They are locked in and are not permitted weapons. It is that there are so many bunkers that if they were all ordered to launch the Air Force is confident that enough of them would do so. Failure to launch responses also averted a number of near catastrophes during the Cold War, including the event the song 99 Red Balloons is named after, where a Soviet officer refused to launch when ordered and the thing his radar said was an incoming nuclear weapon turned out to be a large bundle of balloons. Failures to launch are a known and expected part of the nuclear system.
RE: What the Triad is:
-Silo-based ICBMs also posses warheads with Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicles.
-Bomber based nuclear weapons have increased in variety since 2000 to include a number of cruise missile based warheads with yields smaller than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The US was developing specialized thermonuclear weapons designed to penetrate the kind of super-reinforced underground facilities North Korea and Iran house their nuclear programs in during the the 2000s but development was halted.
-Ballistic missile sub based missiles are do not possess the range of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, but are still ballistic missiles and can strike much of the globe. More recent submarines can also launch the kinds of cruise missiles than can be nuclear armed, including newer attack submarines.
RE: Why the Triad:
The deterrent value of a credible "Second Strike" may be 'madness' but it is a recognition of the fallibility of human psychology. Research has borne out an actual deterrent effect of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In addition a credible "Second Strike" also deters the nation that possesses it. During the 1980s the Soviet Union developed a system known as "Dead Hand" or "Hand from the Grave" designed to automate the USSR's Second Strike. Counter to Dr. Strangelove's advice they did not tell anyone about it, because the point was not to deter the US, but to give Soviet leadership the confidence that they did not have to make split second decisions to destroy humanity, confident that the Dead Hand would respond if a nuke went off. This system is believed to have been active when the USSR collapsed, its current operational status is unknown.
ReplyDeleteRE: Recent Developments: In 2002 the Bush administration produced a Nuclear Posture review that put the US in motion towards a increasing number of smaller 'Tactical' rather than 'Strategic' nuclear weapons. These could more plausibly be used, and this scared many nations and people, the US has since rolled back most of this. What it continues to move forward with is 'Modernization' this is the replacement of old weapons with new ones. There is tremendous resistance to this as well, but many advocates fail to acknowledge the inherent danger of continuing to rely on old systems. The United Kingdom has retired 2 of the 3 legs of its Triad, relying only on submarine based systems now. There is a push for the US to drop the Bomber based leg of its Triad, the Air Force is resisting vehemently.
OHHHHHHHHHHHHH. ok then!
ReplyDeleteYou knew what you were in for when you linked me your post.
ReplyDeleteYeah, Charles King, I thought you might.
ReplyDeleteThis is a 101 thing, not a 301 thing. :-)
Point is to get the essence, if not all the details.
And Matt Johnson? Apologies for misinterpreting for so long.
But yeah, for sure reducing to just subs makes tremendous sense. It's not like we're making more B52s, and we can make more Columbia class subs.
ReplyDeleteHeh, s'ok.
ReplyDeleteWilliam Nichols By "we" I mean the rats and cockroaches.
ReplyDelete